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Fighting consumer price inflation in Africa. What do dynamics in money, 
credit, efficiency and size tell us? 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of policy options in financial 
dynamics (of money, credit, efficiency and size) on consumer prices. Soaring food prices have 
marked the geopolitical landscape of African countries in the past decade. 
 
Design/methodology/approach – We limit our sample to a panel of African countries for which 
inflation is non-stationary. VAR models from both error correction and Granger causality 
perspectives are applied. Analyses of dynamic shocks and responses are also covered. Six 
batteries of robustness checks are applied to ensure consistency in the results.  
 
Findings –  (1) There are significant long-run equilibriums between inflation and each financial 
dynamic. (2) When there is a disequilibrium, while only financial depth and financial size could 
be significantly used to exert deflationary pressures, inflation is significant in adjusting all 
financial dynamics. In other words, financial depth and financial size are more significant 
instruments in fighting inflation than financial efficiency and activity. (3) The financial 
intermediary dynamic of size appears to be more instrumental in exerting a deflationary tendency 
than financial intermediary depth. (4) The deflationary tendency from money supply is double 
that based on liquid liabilities.  
 
Practical implications – Monetary policy aimed at fighting inflation only based on bank 
deposits may not be very effective until other informal and semi-formal financial sectors are 
taken into account. It could be inferred that, tight monetary policy targeting the ability of banks 
to grant credit (in relation to central bank credits) is more effective in tackling consumer price 
inflation than that, targeting the ability of banks to receive deposits. In the same vein, adjusting 
the lending rate could be more effective than adjusting the deposit rate.  The insignificance of 
financial allocation efficiency and financial activity as policy tools in the battle against inflation 
could be explained by the (well documented) surplus liquidity issues experienced by the African 
banking sector.  
 
Social implications – This paper helps in providing monetary policy options in the fight against 
soaring consumer prices. By keeping inflationary pressures on food prices in check, sustained 
campaigns involving strikes, demonstrations, marches, rallies and political crises that seriously 
disrupt economic performance could be mitigated.   
 
Originality/value – As far as we have perused, there is yet no study that assesses monetary 
policy options that could be relevant in addressing the dramatic surge in the price of consumer 
commodities.  
 
Keywords : Banks; Inflation; Development; Panel; Africa 
JEL Classification: E31; G20; O10; O55; P50 
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1. Introduction 
  
 During the past decade, the world has seen a dramatic rise in the price of many staple 
food commodities. For instance, the price of maize increased by 80% between 2005-2007 and 
has since increased further. Many other commodity prices have also soared sharply over this 
period: milk powder by 90%, rice by 25% and wheat by 70%. Such large  variations in prices 
have had tremendous impacts on the incomes of poor households in developing countries (FAO, 
2007; World Bank 2008; Ivanic & Martin, 2008). Assessing how to fight inflation is particularly 
relevant given its positive incidence on poverty (Fujii, 2011), especially in a continent  where 
poverty has remained stubbornly high despite financial reforms and structural adjustment 
policies (Asongu, 2012a). Also, while low inflation may mitigate inequality (Bulir, 1998; Lopez, 
2004), high inflation has been documented to have a negative income redistributive effect 
(Albanesi, 2007) in recent African inequality literature (Asongu, 2012a).  
The overall  effect on poverty rates in African countries is contingent on whether the 
gains to poor net producers outweigh the adverse impact on poor consumers. The bearing of food 
prices on the situation of particular households also depends  importantly on the products 
involved, the patterns of households income and expenditure, as well as policy responses of 
governments. On account of existing analyses, the impacts of higher food prices on poverty and 
inequality are likely to be very diverse; depending on the reasons for the price change and the 
structure of the economy (Ravallion & Lokhsin, 2005; Hertel & Winters, 2006). While the 
effects of soaring food prices on inequality  and poverty may depend on certain circumstances, 
most analysts agree that, sustained increased in food prices ultimately leads to sociopolitical  
unrests like those experienced in 2008.  
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The World Bank has also raised concerns over the impact of high prices on socio-
political stability (World Bank, 2008). Most studies confirm the link between rising food prices 
and the recent waves of revolutions that have marked the geopolitical landscape of developing 
countries over the last couple of months (World Bank, 2008; Wodon & Zaman, 2010). The 
premises of the Arab Spring and hitherto unanswered questions about some of its dynamics 
could be traced to poverty; owing to unemployment and rising food prices. “We will take to the 
streets in demonstrations  or we will steal,” a 30-year old Egyptian woman in 2008 vented her 
anger  as she stood outside a bakery. Riots  and demonstrations linked to soaring consumer 
prices took place in over 30 countries between 2007-08. The Middle East encountered food riots 
in Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Yemen. In Ivory Coast, thousands marched to the  home of 
President then Laurent Gbagbo chanting: “you are going to kill us”,“ we are hungry”, “life is too 
expensive” …etc. Similar demonstrations followed in  many other African countries, including , 
Cameroon, Senegal, Ethiopia, Burkina Faso, Mozambique, Mauritania and Guinea. In Latin 
America, violent clashes and demonstrations over rising food prices occurred in Guatemala, 
Peru, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Argentina, Mexico and the Haitian prime minister was even toppled 
following food riots. In Asia, people flooded the streets in Bangladesh, Cambodia, Thailand, 
India and the Philippines. Even North Korea surprisingly experienced an incident in which 
market women gathered to protest against restrictions on their ability to trade in food (Hendrix et 
al., 2009). The geopolitical landscape in the last couple of months has also revolved around the 
inability of some political regimes to implement concrete policies that  ensure the livelihoods of 
their citizens. Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco, Senegal, Uganda, Zambia, Mauritania, Sudan, Western 
Sahara and most recently Nigeria are some countries that have witnessed major or minor unrests 
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via techniques of civil resistance in sustained campaigns involving strikes, demonstrations, 
marches and rallies.  
Whereas the literature on the causes and impacts of the crisis in global food prices in the 
developing world has mushroomed in recent years (Piesse & Thirtle, 2009; Wodon & Zaman, 
2010; Masters & Shively, 2008), we are unaware of studies that have closely examined how 
financial policies affected consumer prices. Remedial policy and pragmatic choices aimed at 
fighting inflation that have been documented include both short and medium term responses 
(SIFSIA, 2011). Short-term and immediate measures include: input vouchers and input trade 
fairs (seeds, fertilizer and tools) for vulnerable farmers; reinforcement of capacity (training and 
equipment) in income generating activities; safety-nets (cash transfers or food vouchers); tax 
measures and government policies. Medium term measures could be clubbed into three strands: 
trade and market measures; production and productivity incentives; coordination and activation 
of food security plan. Firstly, trade and market measures include: reduction of import taxes on 
basic food items and grain-export bans when needed; strengthening the food and agricultural 
market information system; conducting of value chain analysis; building of efficient marketing 
institutions; facilitation of farming contract arrangements; lowering of distribution cost; strategic 
reserve support and government anticipation of price increase. Secondly, production and 
productivity incentives include: investing in agriculture; addressing of poor harvest and 
promotion of shelf-life products. Thirdly, coordination and activation of food security action 
plan involve: coordination and coherence among various agencies engaged in price stabilization 
efforts; comprehensiveness of multi-sectoral responses to price hikes and  coordination 
(synchronization) of food insecurity plan, in a bid to achieve the maximum impact.  
 6
According to Von Braun (2008), monetary and exchange rate policy responses were not 
effective in addressing food inflation. This revelation by the Director General of the International 
Food Policy Research Institute has motivated us to peruse the literature in search of monetary 
policies on soaring food prices. Finding none, the present paper  fills this gap in the literature by 
assessing how financial development dynamics in money, credit, activity, efficiency and size 
could be exploited in monetary policy to keep food prices in check. In plainer terms, this work 
aims to assess the impact of the following dynamics on food prices. (1) Money: the role of 
financial depth (in  dynamics of overall economic money supply and financial system liquid 
liabilities). (2) Credit: the incidence of financial activity dynamics (in banking and financial 
system perspectives). (3) Efficiency: the impact of  financial intermediary allocation efficiency 
(from banking and financial system angles). (4) Size: the part financial size plays. Another 
appeal of this paper is the scarcity of literature on the effect of financial development on inflation 
despite a substantial body of work on the economic and financial consequences of inflation 
(Barro, 1995; Bruno & Easterly, 1998; Bullard & Keating, 1995; DeGregorio, 1992; Boyd et al., 
2001).   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents data and discusses the 
methodology. Empirical analysis is outlined in Section 3. Discussion and policy implications are 
covered in Section 4.  Section 5 concludes.  
2. Data and Methodology 
2.1 Data 
 
 We examine a panel of 10 African countries with data from the Financial Development 
and Structure Database (FDSD) and African Development Indicators (ADI) of the World Bank 
(WB). The ensuing balanced panel is restricted from 1980 to 2010 owing to constraints in data 
availability. Information on summary statistics and correlation analysis is detailed in Appendix 1 
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and Appendix 3 respectively. Definition of the variables and corresponding sources are presented 
in Appendix 2. Countries in the sample include: Algeria, Egypt, Lesotho, Morocco, Nigeria, 
Sudan, Tunisia, Uganda1, Zambia and Tanzania2. The limitation to these countries is primarily 
based on the inability of some African countries to exhibit a unit root in consumer price inflation. 
Given the problem statement of the study, it is interesting to have non-stationary consumer price 
inflation for consistent modeling. Hence, in accordance with recent African law-finance 
literature (Asongu, 2011a), CFA franc 3 countries of the CEMAC4 and UEMOA5 zones have not 
been included6. Beside the justifications  for eliminating CFA franc countries provided by 
preliminary analysis and recent theoretical postulations (Asongu, 2011a), the seminal work of 
Mundell (1972) has shown that, African countries with flexible exchange rates regimes have 
more to experience in the fight against inflation than their counterparts with fixed exchange rate 
regimes7.  
                         
1
“Despite decelerating to 27.0 percent in December 2011 from a high of 30.4 percent in October, inflation in 
Uganda is still far higher than expected, given the 3 percent rate at the end of 2010. Year-on-year food inflation 
spiked to 45.6 percent in October 2011, while non-food inflation has been increasing steadily, moving to 22.8 
percent from 5.5 percent in December 2010”  (Simpasa et al., 2011, p. 3).  
2
 “Tanzania inflation reached 19.8 percent in December 2011, well above the 10 percent average for the last few 
years. However, in 2010, inflationary pressures started to build, fuelled by soaring food and energy prices, while the 
government’s fiscal outlays added to the inflationary pressure. Since October 2010, inflation has more than tripled, 
reaching 17.9 percent in October 2011. Although food inflation has slowed recently, it is unlikely to offset other 
inflationary pressures ”  (Simpasa et al., 2011, p. 3). 
3The CFA franc is the name of two currencies used in Africa (by some former French colonies) which are 
guaranteed by the French treasury.  The two CFA franc currencies are the West African CFA franc (used in the 
UEMOA zone) and Central African CFA franc (used in the CEMAC zone). The two currencies though theoretically 
separate are effectively interchangeable.  
4
 Economic and Monetary Community of Central African States. 
5
 Economic and Monetary Community of West African States.  
6
 The need for inflation to exhibit a unit root in order to accommodate the problem statement draws from an’ 
inflation uncertainty’ theory in recent African finance literature. “The dominance of English common–law countries 
in prospects for financial development in the legal–origins debate has been debunked by recent findings. Using 
exchange rate regimes and economic/monetary integration oriented hypotheses, this paper proposes an 'inflation 
uncertainty theory' in providing theoretical justification and empirical validity as to why French civil–law countries 
have higher levels of financial allocation efficiency. Inflation uncertainty, typical of floating exchange rate regimes 
accounts for the allocation inefficiency of financial intermediary institutions in English common–law countries. As a 
policy implication, results support the benefits of fixed exchange rate regimes in financial intermediary allocation 
efficiency” Asongu (2011a, p.1). Also, before restricting the dataset, we have found from preliminary analysis that, 
African  CFA franc countries have a relatively very stable inflation rate.  
7
 “The French and English traditions in monetary theory and history have been different… The French tradition has 
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In line with the literature (Bordo & Jeanne, 2002; Hendrix et al., 2009) and the problem 
statement, the dependent variable is measured in terms of annual percentage change in the 
Consumer Price Index (CPI). For clarity in organization, the independent variables are presented 
in terms of depth, efficiency, activity and size.  
 Firstly, from a financial intermediary depth standpoint,  we are consistent with the FDSD 
and recent African finance literature (Asongu, 2011bcd) in measuring financial depth both from 
overall-economic and financial system perspectives with indicators of broad money supply 
(M2/GDP) and financial system deposits (Fdgdp) respectively. Whereas the former represents 
the monetary base plus demand, saving and time deposits, the latter denotes liquid liabilities of 
the financial system. Since we are dealing exclusively with developing countries, we distinguish 
liquid liabilities from money supply because a great chunk of the monetary base does not transit 
via the banking sector (Asongu, 2011e).  The two indicators are in ratios of GDP (see Appendix 
2) and can robustly check one another as either account for over 98% of information in the other 
(see Appendix 3). 
 Secondly, by financial efficiency8 here, we neither refer to the profitability-related 
concept nor to the production efficiency of decision making units in the financial sector (through 
Data Envelopment Analysis: DEA). What the paper aims to elucidate is the ability of banks to 
effectively fulfill their fundamental role of transforming mobilized deposits into credit for 
                                                                               
stressed the passive nature of monetary policy and the importance of exchange stability with convertibility; stability 
has been achieved at the expense of institutional development and monetary experience. The British countries by 
opting for monetary independence have sacrificed stability, but gained monetary experience and better developed 
monetary institutions.” (Mundell, 1972,  pp. 42-43). 
8
 “It is widely acknowledged that money growth must be seen as more dangerous for price stability when 
accompanied by strong credit. On the contrary, robust money growth not associated with sustained credit expansion 
and strong dynamics in asset prices seems to be less likely to have inflationary consequences”.(Anonymous 
Referee). This is consistent with a recent strand of empirical literature (Bordo & Jeanne, 2002; Borio & Lowe, 2002; 
Borio and Lowe, 2004; Detken & Smets, 2004; Van den Noord, 2006; Roffia & Zaghini, 2008; Bhaduri & Durai, 
2012). These comment and fact  have been incorporated into the analysis from an efficiency standpoint. Financial 
intermediary allocation efficiency reflects how money growth (through bank deposits) is accompanied by credit 
facilities.   
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economic operators. We adopt indicators of banking-system-efficiency and financial-system-
efficiency (respectively ‘bank credit on bank deposits: Bcbd’ and ‘financial system credit on 
financial system deposits: Fcfd’). As with financial depth dynamics, these two financial 
allocation efficiency proxies can check each other as either represent more than 95% of 
variability in the other (see Appendix 3).  
 Thirdly, in accordance with the FDSD,  we proxy for financial intermediary development 
size as the ratio of “deposit bank assets” to “total assets” (deposit bank assets on central bank 
assets plus deposit bank assets: Dbacba).  
 Fourthly, by financial intermediary activity, the paper points out the ability of banks to 
grant credit to economic operators.  We appreciate both bank-sector-activity and financial-
sector-activity with “private domestic credit by deposit banks: Pcrb” and “private credit by 
domestic banks and other financial institutions: Pcrbof” respectively. The former measure 
checks the latter as it represents more than 98% of information in the latter (see Appendix 3). 
 
2.2 Methodology 
 
 The estimation technique typically follows mainstream literature on fighting inflation 
(Bernanke & Gertler, 1995; Detken & Smets, 2004; Goujon, 2006). The estimation approach 
entails the following steps: unit root tests, cointegration tests, vector error correction estimation, 
Granger causality modeling and impulse-response analysis. Robustness checks are ensured by: 
(1) the use of alternative financial indicators; (2) consideration of homogenous and 
heterogeneous assumptions in both unit root and cointegration tests; (3) optimal lag selection for 
goodness of fit in model specification consistent with the recommendations of Liew (2004); (4) 
usage of bivariate analysis to limit causality misspecification issues; (5) application of vector 
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error correction and simple Granger causality and; (6) verifying that, the signs and intervals of 
the error correction terms are consistent with theory.  
 
3. Empirical Analysis  
 
3.1 Unit root tests 
 
 We begin by testing for serial correlations with two types of panel unit root tests. When 
the variables are not stationary in level, we proceed to test for stationarity in first difference. 
While short-run Granger causality presupposes the absence of unit roots, the Vector Error 
Correction Model (VECM) requires that the variables have a unit root (non stationary) in level 
(series). There are two main types of panel unit root tests: first generational (that assumes cross 
sectional independence); and second generational (based on cross sectional dependence). A 
precondition for the application of the latter is a cross sectional dependence test which is possible 
only and only if the number of cross sections (N) in a panel exceed the number of periods in the 
cross-sections (T). Hence, we focus on the first generational type. To this end, both the Levin, 
Lin & Chu (LLC, 2002) and Im, Pesaran & Shin (IPS, 2003) tests are applied. Whereas the 
former is a homogenous based panel unit root test (common unit as null hypothesis), the latter is 
a heterogeneous oriented test (individual unit roots  as null hypotheses). In case of conflict of 
interest in the results, IPS (2003) takes precedence over LLC (2002) in decision making because, 
according to Maddala & Wu (1999), the alternative hypothesis of  LLC (2002) is too powerful. 
Consistent with Liew (2004), goodness of fit is ensured by the Hannan-Quinn Information 
Criterion (HQC) and the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) for the LLC (2002) and IPS (2003) 
tests respectively9.  
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“The major findings in the current simulation study are previewed as follows. First, these criteria managed to pick 
up the correct lag length at least half of the time in small sample. Second, this performance increases substantially 
as sample size grows. Third, with relatively large sample (120 or more observations), HQC is found to outdo the 
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Table 1: Panel unit root tests 
          
  LLC tests for homogenous panel IPS tests for heterogeneous panel 
  Panel A: Financial Depth and Efficiency  
Deterministic 
components 
Financial Depth Financial Efficiency Financial Depth Financial Efficiency 
M2 Fdgdp BcBd FcFd M2 Fdgdp BcBd FcFd 
Level c 3.396 2.616 0.346 0.055 2.926 2.764 0.088 -0.011 
ct 3.138 3.820 0.701 2.230 3.131 3.870 1.136 1.466 
First 
difference 
c -2.255** -1.328* 1.096 0.861 -3.73*** -2.115** -3.24*** -1.357* 
ct -1.916** -0.415 2.637 1.796 -2.032** -1.367* -2.026** -0.924 
          
  Panel B: Financial Activity, Financial size and Inflation 
  Financial Activity Fin. Size Inflation Financial Activity Fin. Size Inflation 
  Pcrb Pcrbof Dbacba Infl. Pcrb Pcrbof Dbacba Infl. 
Level c 1.519 1.057 2.175 -0.271 3.099 2.279 2.454 0.694 
ct 2.887 2.644 0.307 0.264 3.266 2.963 0.494 0.833 
First 
difference 
c 0.431 -0.167 -2.042** 3.142 -1.367* -1.897** -4.83*** -5.55*** 
ct -3.26*** -3.58*** 7.004 6.848 -1.223 -1.947** -2.38*** -3.69*** 
          
Notes: *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. ‘c’ and ‘ct’: ‘constant’ and ‘constant and trend’ respectively. Maximum 
lag is 8 and optimal lags are chosen via HQC for LLC test and  AIC for IPS test. Optimal lag for the most part is 2. LLC: Levin, Lin & Chu 
(2002). IPS: Im, Pesaran & Shin (2003).  M2: Money Supply. Fdgdp: Liquid Liabilities. BcBd: Banking System Efficiency. FcFd: Financial 
System Efficiency. Pcrb: Banking System Activity. Pcrbof: Financial System Activity. Dabcba: Financial Size. Infl: Inflation. Fin: Financial. 
 
Table 1 above reports the panel unit root tests results. It can be observed that, all the 
variables exhibit a unit root in level; that is, they are non-stationary. However, on account of the 
IPS (2003) results, the variables are overwhelmingly stationary in first difference. These findings 
indicate the possibility of a long-run equilibrium (cointegration) among variables; because 
according to Engel-Granger theorem, two variables that are not stationary may have a linear 
combination in the long-run (Engle & Granger, 1987). 
 
3.2 Cointegration tests 
 
 According to the cointegration theory, two or more series that have a unit root may have 
a linear combination (equilibrium) in a long-run. In this equilibrium, permanent movements of 
one factor (variable) affect permanent movements in the other factor.  
                                                                               
rest in correctly identifying the true lag length. In contrast, AIC and FPE should be a better choice for smaller 
sample. Fourth, AIC and FPE are found to produce the least probability of under estimation among all criteria 
under study. Finally, the problem of over estimation, however, is negligible in all cases. The findings in this 
simulation study, besides providing formal groundwork supportive of the popular choice of AIC in previous 
empirical researches, may as well serve as useful guiding principles for future economic researches in the 
determination of autoregressive lag length”(Liew, 2004, p. 2).  
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Table 2: Bivariate panel cointegration tests (Pedroni and Kao Engle-Granger based tests) 
         
 Panel A: Depth, Efficiency and Inflation 
 Financial Depth and Inflation Financial Efficiency and Inflation 
 M2 and Inflation  Fdgdp and Inflation  BcBd and Inflation  FcFd and Inflation  
 c ct c ct c ct c ct 
 Engle-Granger based Pedroni test for heterogeneous panel 
Panel v-Statistics  -0.484 -1.598 -0.712 -2.066 -0.861 -2.447 -1.160 -2.871 
Panel rho-Statistics -1.445* -1.686** -1.677** -1.630* -2.84*** -2.95*** -2.622*** -1.896** 
Panel PP-Statistics -1.828** -3.702*** -2.083** -3.47*** -3.10*** -4.27*** -3.193*** -3.76*** 
Panel ADF-Statistics -0.721 -1.526* -1.131 -1.681** -1.07 -1.68** -0.626 0.111 
 
        
Group rho-Statistics -0.373 -0.340 -0.797 -0.287 -1.67** -1.525* -1.208 -0.742 
Group PP-Statistics -1.534* -4.029*** -2.362*** -4.33*** -1.911** -2.66*** -2.75*** -6.47*** 
Group ADF-Statistics -0.300 -1.988** -1.313* -2.291** 0.041 0.183 0.247 0.508 
         
 Engle-Granger based Kao test for homogenous panel 
-ADF t statistics 0.036 n.a -0.592 n.a -0.696 n.a -1.752** n.a 
         
 
Panel B: Activity, Size and Inflation 
 
Financial Activity and Inflation Financial Size and Inflation 
 
Pcrb and Inflation  Pcrbof and Inflation  Dbacba and Inflation 
  
 
c ct c ct c ct 
  
 Engle-Granger based Pedroni test for heterogeneous panel   
Panel v-Statistics  -0.885 -2.608 -0.639 -2.377 0.330 -1.653   
Panel rho-Statistics -2.44*** -2.12** -2.719*** -2.097** -2.97*** -1.964**   
Panel PP-Statistics -2.71*** -3.69*** -2.949*** -3.72*** -3.03*** -3.17***   
Panel ADF-Statistics 0.202 0.795 -0.399 -0.074 -3.10*** -2.154**   
        
 
Group rho-Statistics -1.120 -0.561 -1.764** -1.375* -2.038** -1.187   
Group PP-Statistics -2.60*** -4.51*** -3.215*** -5.60*** -2.191** -2.358***   
Group ADF-Statistics 0.703 0.697 -0.140 -0.587 -0.439 -0.216   
        
 
 Engle-Granger based Kao test for homogenous panel   
 
-0.317 n.a -0.069 n.a -0.389 n.a 
  
         
Notes: *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. ‘c’ and ‘ct’: ‘constant’ and ‘constant and trend’ respectively. M2: Money 
Supply. Fdgdp: Liquid Liabilities. BcBd: Banking System Efficiency. FcFd: Financial System Efficiency. Pcrb: Banking System Activity. 
Pcrbof: Financial System Activity. Dabcba: Financial Size. PP: Phillips-Peron. ADF: Augmented Dickey Fuller. No deterministic trend 
assumption. Maximum lags is 8 and optimal lags are chosen via  AIC. Optimal lags for the most part is 1, with exceptions of tests for financial 
system efficiency and financial system activity where 3 and 2 lags are used respectively.  
  
To investigate this long-run relationship, we test for cointegration using Engle-Granger 
based Pedroni and Engle-Granger Kao tests. Consistent with Camarero & Tamarit (2002), the 
advantage of applying these two tests is that, while the former (Pedroni; 1999) is heterogeneous, 
the latter (Kao; 1999) is homogenous based. Implementation of both tests is in line with our 
earlier application of both homogenous (LLC) and heterogeneous (IPS) unit root tests. Similar 
deterministic trend components used in unit root tests are applied. However, the Pedroni (1999) 
test will be  given priority in event of conflict of interest because, it has more deterministic 
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components10. Optimal lag selection for goodness of fit is by the AIC. The choice of bivariate 
statistics instead of multivariate statistics is to avoid misspecification in causality estimations11.  
Table 2 above reports results of the cointegration tests. While Panel A reports the long-
term relationship between financial depth (efficiency) and inflation, Panel B reveals findings for 
the long-run equilibrium between financial activity (size) and inflation. It could be observed 
from the Engle-Granger based Pedroni test that, there is overwhelming evidence of a long-term 
relationship between each financial dynamic and inflation. It follows that in the long-run, 
permanent changes in each financial dynamic affect permanent changes in inflation. Hence, the 
need to investigate short-term adjustments to this long-run equilibrium with the VECM. 
 
3.3 Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) 
 
 Let us consider inflation and a financial dynamic with no lagged difference, such that: 
 
titi FinanceInflation ,, β=                                                            (1) 
 
The resulting VECMs are the following: 
 
ttititi FinanceInflationInflation ,11,1,, )( εβ +−∂=∆ −−                 (2) 
 
ttititi InflationFinanceFinance ,21,1,, )( εβσ +−=∆ −−                 (3) 
 
 In Eq. (1) and Eq. (2), the right hand terms are the Error Correction Terms (ECTs). At 
equilibrium, the value of the ECT is zero. When the ETC is non-zero, it implies that inflation and 
a financial dynamic have deviated from the long-run equilibrium; and the ECT helps each 
variable to adjust and partially restore the equilibrium. The speeds of these adjustments are 
measured by ∂  and  σ  for inflation and a given financial dynamic respectively. Hence, Eqs. (1) 
and (2) are replicated for each ‘financial dynamic and inflation’ pair. The same deterministic 
                         
10
 Pedroni (1999) is applied in the presence of both ‘constant’ and  ‘constant and trend’ while Kao (1999) is based 
only on the former (constant).  
11
 For example, multivariate cointegration may involve variables that are stationary in levels (See Gries et al., 2009).  
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trend assumptions used in the cointegration tests are applied and optimal lag selection for 
goodness of fit in model specification is in line with the AIC (Liew, 2004).  
 Based on results reported in Table 3, while only financial depth and financial size are 
exogenous to deflationary pressures, inflation is exogenous to all financial intermediary 
dynamics under consideration. In other words, when there is a disequilibrium, while only 
financial depth and financial size could be significantly used to exert inflationary pressures, 
inflation is significant in adjusting all financial dynamics. Panel A and Panel B are based on Eqs. 
(2) and (3) respectively. The ECTs have the expected signs and are in the right interval (See 
Section 3.5 on robustness checks for discussion below). In event of a shock,  short-run 
adjustments of finance to the equilibrium (Panel B) are faster than short-term adjustments  of 
inflation (Panel A). Hence, finance is more endogenous to inflation than finance is exogenous to 
inflation.  Since some models (financial efficiency and activity in Panel A for the most part) are 
cointegrated with inflation but have no significant corresponding short-term adjustments to long-
run equilibrium, we proceed to analyze the relationship of the variables under consideration by 
simple Granger causality.  
 
3.4 Granger Causality  
 
 Considering a basic bivariate finite-order VAR model, simple Granger causality is based 
on the assessment of how past values of a financial dynamic could help past values of inflation in 
explaining the present value of inflation. In mainstream literature, this model is applied on 
variables that are not cointegrated (that is, pairs that are stationary in levels). However, within 
our framework we are applying this test to  all pairs in ‘first difference’ for two reasons: ensure 
comparability and; the model can be applied only when variables are stationary and ours are 
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stationary only in ‘first difference’. In light of the above, the resulting VAR models are the 
following:  
tiijti
q
j
ijjti
p
j
ijti FinanceInflationInflation ,,
0
,
1
,
εµδλ ++∆+∆=∆
−
=
−
=
∑∑
……..(4) 
tiijti
q
j
ijjti
p
j
ijti InflationFinanceFinance ,,
0
,
1
,
εµδλ ++∆+∆=∆
−
=
−
=
∑∑
………(5) 
 
 The null hypothesis of Eq. (4) is the position that, Finance does not Granger cause 
Inflation. Hence, a rejection of the null hypothesis is captured by the significant F-statistics; 
which is the Wald statistics for the joint hypothesis that estimated parameters of lagged values 
equal zero. Optimal lag selection for goodness of fit is in accordance with the AIC (Liew, 2004). 
Based on the results reported in Table 3 below, while financial size causes inflation, the latter 
causes financial depth (money supply and liquidity liabilities).  
Table 3: Vector Error Correction Model and Granger Causality estimations  
         
  Panel A: Deflationary Adjustments (Finance effects on Inflation) 
  Financial Depth Fin. Efficiency Financial Activity Fin. Size 
  M2 Fdgdp BcBd FcFd Pcrb Pcrbof Dbacba 
VECM ECT  -0.0002*** -0.0001* -0.0001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.0006** 
(t-statistics) (-2.563) (-1.971) (-0.388) (-0.612) (-0.843) (-1.023) (-2.072) 
Granger 
Causality  
Short-run F-stats 1.710 0.816 1.372 2.239 0.625 0.516 3.405** 
         
  Panel B: Financial Adjustments (Inflation effects on Finance) 
  Financial Depth Fin. Efficiency Financial Activity Fin. Size 
  M2 Fdgdp BcBd FcFd Pcrb Pcrbof Dbacba 
VECM ECT  -0.213*** -0.208*** -0.163*** -0.187*** -0.205*** -0.204*** -0.158** 
(t-statistics) (-4.945) (-4.865) (-3.811) (-4.736) (-4.781) (-4.851) (-2.344) 
Granger 
Causality  
Short-run F-stats  2.416* 2.510* 0.355 0.442 1.868 1.584 2.228 
         
Notes: *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. ‘c’ and ‘ct’: ‘constant’ and ‘constant and trend’ respectively. M2: Money 
Supply. Fdgdp: Liquid Liabilities. BcBd: Banking System Efficiency. FcFd: Financial System Efficiency. Pcrb: Banking System Activity. 
Pcrbof: Financial System Activity. Dabcba: Financial Size. VECM: Vector Error Correction Model. ECT: Error Correction Term. The 
deterministic trend assumptions and lag selection criteria  for the VECM are the same as in the cointegration tests (No deterministic trend 
assumption. Maximum lag is 8 and optimal lags are chosen via the  AIC. Optimal lags for the most part is 1, with exceptions of analyses for 
financial system efficiency and financial system activity in which 3 and 2 lags are used respectively). For Granger causality, the optimal lag 
selection is based on the AIC. F(t): Fisher (student) statistics. Fin: Financial. 
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3.5 Robustness checks 
 
 In order to ensure that our results are robust, we have performed the following.  (1) With 
the exception of financial size, (for every financial dynamic) two indicators have been employed. 
Hence, the findings have encapsulated measures of financial intermediary performance both 
from banking and financial system perspectives.  (2) Both homogenous and heterogeneous 
assumptions are applied in the unit root and cointegration tests. (3) Optimal lag selection for 
goodness of fit in model specifications is in line with the recommendations of Liew (2004). (4) 
By using bivariate analysis in cointegration tests and corresponding VECM estimations, we have 
limited causality misspecification issues. (5) Both  VECM and simple Granger VAR 
specifications for respectively long-run and short-term causality have been applied. (6) The signs 
and intervals of the ECTs conform to theory. 
  While the first five points have already been elucidated above, the sixth has only been 
highlighted. Hence, the need to discuss its relevance to the results.  In principle, the speed of 
adjustment of the parameters should be between zero and ‘minus one’ (0, -1). If the ECTs are not 
within this interval, then either the model is misspecified (and needs adjustment) or the data is 
inadequate (perhaps owing to issues with degrees of freedom)12.  
 
4. Dynamic responses to shocks and policy implications   
 
4. 1 Dynamic responses 
 
 Using a Choleski decomposition on a VAR with ordering: 1) inflation, 2) a financial 
dynamic; we compute impulse response functions (IRFs) for inflation and financial dynamics. 
                         
12
 “The error correction term tells us the speed with which our model returns to equilibrium following an exogenous 
shock. It should be negatively signed, indicating a move back towards equilibrium, a positive sign indicates 
movement away from equilibrium. The coefficient should lie between 0 and 1, 0 suggesting no adjustment one time 
period later, 1 indicates full adjustment. The error correction term can be either the difference between the 
dependent and explanatory variable (lagged once) or the error term (lagged once), they are in effect the same 
thing” (Babazadeh & Farrokhnejad, 2012, p.73).  
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However, given the character of the problem statement in this study, policy implications will be 
based on the responses of inflation to shocks in financial dynamics. In other words, how one 
standard deviation in financial dynamic innovations affect inflation. A negative response of 
inflation to a (positive) shock in a financial dynamic will imply a deflationary tendency in the 
consumer price index. Hence, an effective shock in the fight against inflation. Appendices 4-10 
present graphical representations corresponding to the IRFs.  
 The dotted lines shown around the IRFs in Appendices 4-10 are the two standard 
deviation bands, which are used as a measure of significance (Agénor et al., 1997, p. 19).  A 
number of results are noteworthy. Firstly, the results obtained for dynamics of each financial 
dimension are broadly similar, indicating robustness of our results to the choice of corresponding 
financial dynamics within each financial dimension13. Secondly, shocks in financial dynamics 
have a significant impact on the temporary component of inflation. Broadly across the IRFs, a 
decrease in a financial intermediary performance dynamic leads to a (temporary) decrease in 
inflation (deflation)14. This effect is consistent with the theoretical predictions and illustrate the 
contraction of financial intermediary activities as a measure of fighting inflation. Though all 
financial adjustments from a VEC framework are significant with the right signs, from a VAR-
based IRFs framework, (owing to the problem statement), policy implications will only be based 
on deflationary adjustments (shocks in financial dynamics of depth and size) because, these have 
significant adjustment terms from a VECM-based framework (see Panel A of Table 3).  
                         
13For example, from a financial depth perspective, the response to a money supply shock is similar to that of a liquid 
liability shock. In the same vein, the response of a banking efficiency shock is similar to that of a financial 
efficiency shock. This same analogy applies to financial intermediary activity (from banking  and financial system 
perspectives).  
14In Appendix 4, a one standard deviation  negative shock to money supply sharply decreases inflation within the 
first year, then slightly decreases it again  the next year before a  slightly steady inflationary effect after the second 
year (see response of INFLATION to M2). The deflationary effect in the first year of the shock is consistent with 
the liquid liabilities perspective of financial depth in Appendix 5. Here again, a one standard deviation negative 
shock of liquidity liabilities has a deflationary pressure on consumer prices within the first year (see response of 
INFLATION to FDGDP). 
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 Hence, the following findings have been established. (1) There are significant long-run 
equilibriums between inflation and each financial dynamic. (2) When there is a disequilibrium, 
while only financial depth and financial size could be significantly used to exert deflationary 
pressures, inflation is significant in adjusting all financial dynamics. In other words, financial 
depth and financial size are more significant instruments in fighting inflation than financial 
efficiency and activity. (3) The financial intermediary dynamic of size appears to be more 
instrumental in exerting a deflationary tendency than financial intermediary depth. (4) The 
deflationary tendency from money supply is double that based on liquid liabilities.  
 
4.2 Policy implications, caveats and future directions 
 
 Four main policy implications could be derived from the findings established above. 
Firstly, the fact that the effectiveness of money supply as an instrumental tool in fighting 
inflation almost doubles that of liquid liabilities (bank deposits) is consistent with theoretical 
postulations that, a great chunk of the monetary base in developing countries does not transit 
through the banking sector. Hence, monetary policy aimed at fighting inflation only based on 
bank deposits may not be very effective until other informal and semi-formal financial sectors 
are taken into account. An eloquent example is the growing phenomenon of mobile banking in 
African countries (that constitute  the monetary base but) not captured by mainstream monetary 
policies based on formal financial activities (Asongu, 2012b). Secondly,  financial intermediary 
size15 appears to be more effective than financial intermediary dynamics of depth (money supply 
and bank deposits). In other words, decreasing financial intermediary assets (in relation to central 
bank assets) more substantially exerts deflationary pressures on consumer prices. It could 
therefore be inferred that, tight monetary policy targeting the ability of banks to grant credit (in 
                         
15Financial size as defined by our paper is also in relative terms (bank assets on total assets). Total assets here refer 
to bank assets plus central bank assets. Bank assets refer to credit granted to economic operators.   
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relation to central bank credits) is more effective in fighting consumer price inflation, than that 
targeting the ability of banks to receive deposits. In the same vein, adjusting the lending  rate 
could be more effective than adjusting the deposit rate.  Thirdly, we have seen that financial 
depth and financial size are more significant instruments in fighting inflation than financial 
efficiency16 and activity17. The deflationary effects of reducing financial allocation efficiency 
and credit allocation have had the rights signs but not significant. While inherent surplus 
liquidity issues in African banks could explain the insignificance of the efficiency dimension 
(Saxegaard, 2006), we expected the inflation-mitigation effect of financial activity to be 
significant. The insignificant character of financial activity as an effective instrument in fighting 
inflation may be sample-specific. Hence, the result should not be treated with caution and not 
generalized to all African countries18. 
 To the best of our knowledge, the absence of literature dedicated to examining the 
bearing of financial dynamics on inflation makes our results less comparable. In this paper, we 
have only considered financial intermediary determinants of inflation. But in the real world, 
inflation is endogenous to a complex set of variables: exchange rates, wages, price controls…etc. 
Thus, the interaction of money, credit, efficiency and size elasticities of inflation with other 
determinants of inflation could result in other dynamics of consumer price variations. 
 Hence, it would  be interesting to replicate the analysis in a multivariate VAR context. 
Another interesting future research direction could be to assess whether the findings apply to 
                         
16
 Financial allocation efficiency in the context of this paper refers to the probability  of deposits being transformed 
into credit for economic operators. In other words, financial intermediation efficiency is the ability of financial depth 
to allocate credit for financial activity. Thus financial efficiency is a relative measure (see Beck et al.,1999). 
17
 Financial activity in the context of this paper refers to the ability of financial institutions to grant credit to 
economic operators.  
18The insignificance of financial allocation efficiency and financial activity as policy tools in the battle against 
inflation could be explained by the well documented surplus liquidity issues experienced by the African banking 
sector (Saxegaard, 2006). Thus, allocation inefficiency (due to low transformation of mobilized funds into credit) 
and slow financial activity (limited granting of credit to economic operators) could partly elucidate this finding.  
 
 20
other developing countries. Also, since a substantial chunk of the monetary base is now captured 
by the burgeoning phenomenon of mobile banking, investigating how mobile-banking oriented 
inflation could be managed is a particularly relevant future research focus. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In recent years, the African geopolitical landscape has been marked with political strife 
and social unrests due to increases in consumer prices. This paper had assessed how financial 
intermediary development dynamics could be exploited in monetary policy to keep food prices in 
check. We have  investigated  the impact by examining the roles of money, credit, efficiency and 
financial size on inflationary pressures. Four main findings have been established. (1) There are 
significant long-run equilibriums between inflation and each financial dynamic. (2) When there 
is a disequilibrium, while only financial depth and financial size could be significantly used to 
exert deflationary pressures, inflation is significant in adjusting all financial dynamics. In other 
words, financial depth and financial size are more significant instruments in fighting inflation 
than financial efficiency and activity. (3) The financial intermediary dynamic of size appears to 
be more instrumental in exerting a deflationary tendency than financial intermediary depth. (4) 
The deflationary tendency from money supply is double that based on liquid liabilities. Policy 
implications and future research directions have been discussed. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Summary Statistics  
  Variables Mean S.D Min. Max. Obser. 
 
 
Financial 
Development 
 
Financial 
Depth  
Money Supply 0.397 0.246 0.001 1.141 267 
Liquid Liabilities  0.312 0.206 0.001 0.948 270 
Financial 
Efficiency 
Banking  System Efficiency 0.638 0.349 0.070 2.103 296 
Financial System Efficiency 0.645 0.337 0.139 1.669 270 
Financial 
Activity  
Banking System Activity 0.203 0.190 0.001 0.825 265 
Financial System Activity 0.214 0.200  0.001 0.796  270 
Fin. Size Financial System Size 0.661 0.272 0.017 1.609 293 
        
Dependent   Variable  Consumer   Price  Index  20.524 32.416 -100.00 200.03 297 
S.D: Standard  Deviation. Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum. Obser : Observations. Fin : Financial.  
 
Appendix 2: Variable Definitions 
Variables  Sign Variable Definitions Sources 
    
Inflation  Infl. Consumer Prices (Annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Economic financial depth 
(Money Supply) 
M2 Monetary Base plus demand, saving and time 
deposits (% of GDP) 
World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Financial system depth 
(Liquid liabilities) 
Fdgdp Financial system deposits (% of GDP)   World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Banking system allocation 
efficiency 
BcBd Bank credit on Bank deposits World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Financial system allocation 
efficiency 
FcFd Financial system credit on Financial system 
deposits  
World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Banking system activity Pcrb Private credit by deposit banks (% of GDP) World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Financial system activity Pcrbof Private credit by deposit banks and other financial 
institutions (% of GDP) 
World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Financial size Dbacba Deposit bank assets on Central banks assets plus 
deposit bank assets 
World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Infl: Inflation. M2: Money Supply. Fdgdp: Liquid liabilities. BcBd: Bank credit on Bank deposits. FcFd: Financial system credit on Financial 
system deposits. Pcrb: Private domestic credit by deposit banks. Pcrbof: Private domestic credit by deposit banks and other financial institutions. 
Dbacba: Deposit bank assets on Central bank assets plus deposit bank assets. WDI: World Development Indicators. FDSD: Financial 
Development and Structure Database.  
  
 
Appendix 3: Correlation Analysis  
Financial Depth Financial Efficiency Financial Activity Fin. Size Inflation 
 
M2 Fdgdp BcBd FcFd Pcrb Pcrbof Dbacba Infl. 
 
1.000 0.987 0.172 0.199 0.776 0.758 0.503 -0.357 M2 
 1.000 0.171 0.193 0.779 0.762 0.543 -0.380 Fdgdp 
  1.00 0.955 0.674 0.684 0.408 -0.205 BcBd 
   1.00 0.697 0.736 0.368 -0.211 FcFd 
    1.00 0.985 0.541 -0.335 Pcrb 
     1.000 0.552 -0.339 Pcrbof 
      1.000 -0.566 Dbacba 
       1.000 Inflation 
M2: Money Supply. Fdgdp: Liquid liabilities. BcBd: Bank credit on Bank deposit  (Banking Intermediary System Efficiency). FcFd: Financial 
credit on Financial deposits (Financial Intermediary System Efficiency). Pcrb: Private domestic credit (Banking Intermediary Activity). Pcrbof: 
Private credit from domestic banks and other financial institutions (Financial Intermediary Activity). Dbacba: Deposit bank assets on deposits 
banks plus central bank assets (Financial size).  Infl: Inflation.  
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Appendix 4: Inflation and Money Supply (M2) 
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Appendix 5: Inflation and Liquid Liabilities (FDGDP) 
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Response of INFLATION to FDGDP
Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
 
 
 
 23
Appendix 6: Inflation and Banking System Efficiency (BCBD) 
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Appendix 7: Inflation and Financial System Efficiency (FCFD) 
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Appendix 8: Inflation and Banking System Activity (PCRDBGDP) 
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Appendix 9: Inflation and Financial System Activity (PCRDBOFGDP) 
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Appendix 10: Inflation and Financial Size (DBACBA)  
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